Brazil’s Civil Code Article 1.783-A, inserted in 2015, describes a person with a disability choosing at least two suitable, trusted people with existing ties to provide information for civil decisions. The person requests the arrangement. Its terms set limits, commitments and duration, respecting their will, rights and interests. The judge hears participants personally, with multidisciplinary assistance and public-prosecutor input. Decisions within agreed limits affect third parties; contract counterparties may request countersignatures. Transaction disputes with a supporter involving risk or significant harm go to the judge. Upheld misconduct complaints lead to removal; replacement requires hearing the person and must be in their interest. The person may request termination at any time; supporters need judicial consideration to leave. This inspected text does not establish funded or available support, an AI ban, effectiveness or current individual applicability.
The UN disability-rights committee’s General Comment No. 1, paragraph 29, calls for support based on the person’s will and preferences, affordable access and a right to refuse, change or end support. Use that standard to question gatekeeping, delay and supporter dominance; this is not a finding that the Brazilian mechanism complies with or violates the Convention.
Compare informal voluntary support, a recognised chosen-support arrangement and an independent human advice service. Test where AI assistance expands a person’s choices and where it weakens accountability or control.
Peru’s Civil Code Article 659-G provides safeguards respecting rights, will and preferences. The requester, or the judge in the exceptional Article 659-E process, sets safeguards including review intervals. The judge must check conduct against the mandate and the person’s wishes. In the regulation’s exceptional judicial-designation provisions, Article 49 requires review at intervals set in the judgment; someone with legitimate interest and justified grounds may request judicial review. These texts do not establish funded or effective oversight or an AI ban. Wider provisions permit specified representation; legal capacity does not depend on appointing support.
Routine oversight can become intrusive, costly or paternalistic. Compare the protection it could offer with its burden and the person’s ability to obtain or refuse unwanted help. Stronger supervision is not automatically better support.
Compare scheduled judicial checks with proportionate review by an identified person, accessible independent advice and a usable complaint route. These are alternatives to test, not demonstrated substitutes for the inspected duties.
Follow the links to the passages listed below. Sources can change. The date we checked a source does not confirm every later change or whether the rule applies to you.