The substantive governance work happening at, between, and around multilateral fora: treaty negotiations, AI Safety Institute network MoUs, forum-shifting between G7 / G20 / OECD / UN, regulatory arbitrage. Distinct from any specific instrument; this is the meta-domain of how governance moves.
Definition & scope
The cross-jurisdiction picture below shows how each of 45 tracked instruments treats this topic. The patterns vary substantially — and 29 regimes are silent, leaving gaps that future policy work could address.
Regulatory approaches
International coordination on AI runs through modalities the matrix flattens into one "governs/implicit" verdict but which differ in bindingness and enforcement 1. (1) Summit declarations — Bletchley (1 Nov 2023) and Seoul (2024) — are hortatory, committing signatories to dialogue, not obligations. (2) Technical networks: the International Network of AI Safety Institutes (Nov 2024) coordinates evaluations, not rules. (3) Standards interoperability: Singapore's Framework and Japan's METI Guidelines map onto the G7 Hiroshima Code and OECD Principles, with the OECD Hiroshima Reporting Framework (2025) enabling comparable disclosures (OECD 2025). (4) Binding treaty: only the Council of Europe Framework Convention 2 imposes binding obligations, and is not yet in force.
Key fault lines
Beneath summit consensus, coordinating AI governance turns on contested questions. First, architectural: a new central body, or coordinate the existing patchwork? Some propose an IAEA-style agency 3; Ho, Barnhart et al. 4 disaggregate across four narrower bodies; Roberts, Hine, Taddeo & Floridi 5 foreground the OECD instead. Second, the bindingness gap: the Council of Europe Convention is binding, yet by the catalog's cells the EU AI Act and most instruments are silent on coordination. Third: multilateralism versus bloc fragmentation. Tallberg et al. 6 and Klein & Patrick (2024) read it as a "regime complex," while techno-bloc work 7 argues states pursue strategic digital sovereignty via selective alliances. Whether it converges on the OECD/UN/G7 mode or hardens into rival blocs is open.
Trajectory / what's changing
The landscape has shifted since the matrix instruments were catalogued. In July 2024 the Global Partnership on AI folded into a 44-member partnership under the OECD (OECD 2024). The first legally binding AI treaty, the Council of Europe Framework Convention, opened for signature 5 September 2024 2, with the US, EU, UK, and Israel among initial signatories, though it awaits ratifications to enter into force. The Seoul Statement of Intent matured into the International Network of AI Safety Institutes (inaugural convening November 2024) (NIST 2024). The OECD Hiroshima Reporting Framework launched February 2025 and published submissions from roughly nineteen developers — though dual-use governance work 8 cautions durable agreements need robust verification beyond voluntary reporting. EO 14148 rescinded EO 14110 (90 FR 8237), and the US AI Safety Institute became the Center for AI Standards and Innovation in June 2025.
Coverage across jurisdictions
Historical primacy & cross-jurisdiction tension
First addressed by UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence on (governs). Subsequent regimes have either codified, diverged from, or remained silent on this baseline.
- Forum-shoppingBletchley Declaration on AI Safety↔EU AI Act
- Forum-shoppingSeoul Declaration on Safe, Innovative and Inclusive AI↔Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, Trustworthy AI
- Forum-shoppingASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics↔Executive Order 14179 — Removing Barriers to American Leadership in AI
Compare jurisdictions: EU vs US · EU vs UK · EU vs CN
Enforcement & impact
Silent regimes — gap signal
Instruments that do not address International Coordination — candidates for future policy work.
- EU AI ActEU
- Executive Order 14110 on Safe, Secure, Trustworthy AIUS
- Executive Order 14179 — Removing Barriers to American Leadership in AIUS
- UK Pro-Innovation Approach to AI Regulation (White Paper)UK
- Interim Measures for Generative AI Service ManagementCN
- G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of ConductG7
- OECD AI Principles (Recommendation)OECD
- Council of Europe Framework Convention on AIcouncil_of_europe
- UN GA Resolution on Safe, Secure, Trustworthy AIUN
- NIST AI Risk Management FrameworkUS
- NIST AI RMF Generative AI ProfileUS
- California SB-1047: Safe and Secure Innovation for Frontier AI Models ActUS
- India Digital Personal Data Protection Act + AI Advisory (MEITY)IN
- Brazil AI Bill (PL 2338/2023)BR
- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)EU
- EU General-Purpose AI Code of PracticeEU
- OMB Memorandum M-24-10 (Advancing Governance, Innovation, and Risk Management for Agency Use of AI)US
- GSA Generative AI and Specialized Computing Infrastructure Acquisition Resource GuideUS
- DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation PathwayUS
- FedRAMP AI Cloud Procurement GuidanceUS
- DFARS Subpart 252.204 (Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting)US
- California SB-53: Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act (TFAIA)US
- California SB 243: Companion ChatbotsUS
- California SB 942: AI Transparency ActUS
- Revised Product Liability Directive (Directive (EU) 2024/2853)EU
- Directive (EU) 2024/2831 on improving working conditions in platform workEU
- Provisions on the Administration of Deep Synthesis of Internet Information ServicesCN
- New York RAISE Act: Responsible AI Safety and Education ActUS
- TAKE IT DOWN Act (Tools to Address Known Exploitation by Immobilizing Technological Deepfakes on Websites and Networks Act)US
Further reading
10 academic & grey-literature sources bearing on this topic — catalogued metadata with a primary link; one-line findings are ✦ AI-generated summaries, labeled as such (charter §7.9). Browse the full literature index.
- The establishment of an international AI agency: an applied solution to global AI governance Peer-reviewed✦ AIProposes a UN-backed International Artificial Intelligence Agency modelled on the IAEA, arguing 'only an IAIA can legitimately oversee a global AI governance framework involving all major powers.'
- Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Council Eur.) — with Introductory Note Peer-reviewed✦ AIReproduces and annotates the first legally binding international AI treaty, grounding cross-border AI governance in legality, proportionality, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination across the AI lifecycle.
- Digital Disintegration: Techno-Blocs and Strategic Sovereignty in the AI Era Peer-reviewed✦ AIArgues states increasingly assert 'strategic digital sovereignty...through selective alliances with firms and other governments,' fragmenting global AI infrastructure into techno-blocs rather than multilateral order.
- Global AI governance: barriers and pathways forward Peer-reviewed✦ AIDiagnoses a global AI governance deficit and, weighing new centralized institutions against coordinating existing ones, recommends foregrounding the OECD as the centre for AI policy expertise.
- Governing dual-use technologies: Case studies of international security agreements and lessons for AI governance Preprint✦ AIMines nuclear, chemical, biosecurity and export-control regimes for institutional-design lessons for AI agreements, emphasising 'robust verification methods, strategies for balancing power between nations' and enforcement.
- Envisioning a Global Regime Complex to Govern Artificial Intelligence Think tank✦ AIArgues AI governance will not be a single institution but 'something less elegant: a regime complex' of overlapping arrangements for science, standards, benefit-sharing and collective security.
- International Institutions for Advanced AI Preprint✦ AIProposes four international institutional models for advanced AI: a Commission on Frontier AI, an Advanced AI Governance Organization, a Frontier AI Collaborative, and an AI Safety Project.
- The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Next Steps for Empirical and Normative Research Peer-reviewed✦ AIMaps global AI governance and sets a dual agenda: "an empirical approach, aimed at mapping and explaining" it and "a normative approach, aimed at developing and applying standards".
- Mapping global AI governance: a nascent regime in a fragmented landscape Peer-reviewed✦ AIMaps a nascent, "polycentric and fragmented" AI governance regime in which the OECD holds "considerable epistemic authority and norm-setting power".
- Policy Instrument Peer-reviewedLascoumes, P. & Le Galès, P. (2007). Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments — From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation. Governance 20(1): 1-21. See also Hood (1983) The Tools of Government, ch. 1-2; Salamon (2002) The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance, pp. 1-47; Howlett (2011) Designing Public Policies, ch. 3-5.
References
Sources cited inline in the analysis (linked from the superscript markers), then the primary instrument sources behind the classifications.
- Schmitt (2022) Mapping global AI governance: a nascent regime in a fragmented landscape, AI and Ethics. 10.1007/s43681-021-00083-y — Maps a nascent, "polycentric and fragmented" AI governance regime in which the OECD holds "considerable epistemic authority and norm-setting power". ↩
- Council of Europe; Introductory Note by Marc Rotenberg (2025) Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Council Eur.) — with Introductory Note, International Legal Materials. 10.1017/ilm.2025.1 — Reproduces and annotates the first legally binding international AI treaty, grounding cross-border AI governance in legality, proportionality, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination across the AI lifecycle. ↩
- Mark Robinson (2025) The establishment of an international AI agency: an applied solution to global AI governance, International Affairs. 10.1093/ia/iiaf105 — Proposes a UN-backed International Artificial Intelligence Agency modelled on the IAEA, arguing 'only an IAIA can legitimately oversee a global AI governance framework involving all major powers.' ↩
- Ho, Barnhart, Trager, Bengio, et al. (2023) International Institutions for Advanced AI, arXiv. arXiv:2307.04699 — Proposes four international institutional models for advanced AI: a Commission on Frontier AI, an Advanced AI Governance Organization, a Frontier AI Collaborative, and an AI Safety Project. ↩
- Roberts, Hine, Taddeo & Floridi (2024) Global AI governance: barriers and pathways forward, International Affairs. 10.1093/ia/iiae073 — Diagnoses a global AI governance deficit and, weighing new centralized institutions against coordinating existing ones, recommends foregrounding the OECD as the centre for AI policy expertise. ↩
- Tallberg, Erman, Furendal, Geith, Klamberg & Lundgren (2023) The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Next Steps for Empirical and Normative Research, International Studies Review. 10.1093/isr/viad040 — Maps global AI governance and sets a dual agenda: "an empirical approach, aimed at mapping and explaining" it and "a normative approach, aimed at developing and applying standards". ↩
- Stephen Weymouth (2025) Digital Disintegration: Techno-Blocs and Strategic Sovereignty in the AI Era, International Organization. 10.1017/S0020818325101070 — Argues states increasingly assert 'strategic digital sovereignty...through selective alliances with firms and other governments,' fragmenting global AI infrastructure into techno-blocs rather than multilateral order. ↩
- Akash R. Wasil, Peter Barnett, Michael Gerovitch, Roman Hauksson, Tom Reed, Jack William Miller (2024) Governing dual-use technologies: Case studies of international security agreements and lessons for AI governance, arXiv (also SSRN). arXiv:2409.02779 — Mines nuclear, chemical, biosecurity and export-control regimes for institutional-design lessons for AI agreements, emphasising 'robust verification methods, strategies for balancing power between nations' and enforcement. ↩
- BLETCHLEY-2023: Declaration §8-10 (international coordination is the operative ask)
- SEOUL-2024: Declaration §5-7 (AISI network, follow-up summits)
- ASEAN-AI-GUIDE-2024: Guide explicitly designed to harmonise across ASEAN-10 member states + interoperate with OECD AI Principles + G7 Hiroshima
- AU-AI-STRATEGY-2024: AU Strategy §6 (coordination with UN GA AI resolutions + AU-EU AI Working Group)
- ANTHROPIC-RSP-2024: Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments signatory; coordinates with US + UK AISIs on capability evaluation
- OPENAI-PREPAREDNESS-2023: Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments signatory; pre-deployment evaluation sharing with US + UK AISIs
- DEEPMIND-FSF-2024: Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments signatory; UK AISI pre-deployment evaluation cooperation
- META-FRONTIER-2024: Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments signatory
- UK-US-AISI-MOU-2024: MoU is the operative bilateral; precedent for the broader AISI network
- WH-VOLUNTARY-2023: Precursor to Seoul Frontier AI Safety Commitments; same signatory base largely overlaps
- SG-MODEL-AI-2024: Framework explicitly aligns with G7 Hiroshima Code + OECD AI Principles; ASEAN Guide pairs
- JP-METI-AI-2024: Guidelines explicit alignment with G7 Hiroshima AI Process Code of Conduct + OECD AI Principles
- UNESCO-AI-ETHICS-2021: Policy Area 'Development and International Cooperation', para 80 — platforms for international cooperation on AI
- IT-AILAW-2025: Art. 1(2)/Art. 2 align the law with EU Reg. 2024/1689; Art. 19(3) requires the national strategy to take account of international humanitarian law; Art. 20(2) designates ACN as the single contact point with EU institutions under AI-Act Art. 70.
- JP-AIPROMO-2025: Act No. 53 of 2025, Arts. 17 & 3(5)
- UN-GDC-2024: GDC Objective 5, paras 55(b) and 56 (A/RES/79/1, Annex I)
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16 instruments tracked.
Does governance work? — the social-science evidence
What the peer-reviewed social science shows: whether the harm this topic addresses is empirically real, and whether governance of it works. The badge is the epistemic status of the evidence(not the policy debate) — “thin” or “absent” efficacy evidence is itself a finding (the “second silence”). Each epistemic-status label is Policy Window's editorial assessment of the cited evidence base (a structured classification), not a verdict any single source issues.
The DESCRIPTIVE premise is well-established: IR scholarship now treats global AI governance as a fragmented 'regime complex' of partially overlapping G7/G20/OECD/GPAI/UN/standards-body arrangements with no central hierarchy (Tallberg et al. 2023 — verified verbatim: 'the emerging governance architecture for AI can be described as a regime complex'; Cihon, Maas & Kemp 2020). But the implied HARM — that forum-shopping and regulatory arbitrage cause a measurable race-to-the-bottom or relocate AI development to lax jurisdictions — is largely theorized/anticipated rather than empirically demonstrated for AI; Tallberg et al. explicitly flag forum-shopping as a dynamic whose presence in the AI regime complex is an open empirical question ('Establishing whether these patterns and dynamics are key features also of the AI regime complex stand out as important priorities in future research'). Honest caveat: the strongest empirical arbitrage evidence comes from analogue footloose digital markets (e.g., ICO reallocation after US securities enforcement) — itself a mixed/contested literature — not from AI firms, so the magnitude of coordination-failure harm in AI specifically remains contested and under-measured.
Sources: Tallberg, Erman, Furendal, Geith, Klamberg & Lundgren 2023 (International Studies Review 25(3): viad040); Cihon, Maas & Kemp 2020 (Should AI Governance be Centralised?, AIES '20: 228-234); Lancieri, Edelson & Bechtold 2025 (AI Regulation: Competition, Arbitrage & Regulatory Capture, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 26(1): 239-262)
There are essentially no impact evaluations showing that the negotiated-coordination mode (AI Safety Institute network MoUs, forum-shifting, multilateral declarations) actually produces regulatory convergence or reduces arbitrage — the AISI Network began only as a statement of intent at the Seoul Summit (Seoul Statement of Intent, 21 May 2024) and held its first operational meeting in November 2024, with no defined metrics or outcome studies, so these soft-law instruments are too new to have measurable effects. The closest analogue evidence is mixed and works through DIFFERENT mechanisms than this topic describes: Bradford's Brussels Effect documents de-facto convergence driven by market access rather than negotiated coordination, and the FATF transgovernmental-network literature shows peer-review mutual evaluation can drive AML convergence — but neither evaluates voluntary AI MoU networks, and FATF's effects come with well-documented unintended consequences (de-risking, financial exclusion). The plain finding: the evidence that AI-governance coordination 'works' is itself missing.
Sources: Bradford 2020 (The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World, Oxford University Press); Nance 2018 (The regime that FATF built: an introduction to the Financial Action Task Force, Crime, Law and Social Change 69(2): 109-129; cf. Slaughter 2004, A New World Order, Princeton University Press); International Network of AI Safety Institutes — Seoul Statement of Intent toward International Cooperation on AI Safety Science (21 May 2024; network's first meeting San Francisco, Nov 2024)